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Introduction 
 
The referendums which preceded the accession of eight former communist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to the EU in 2004 were largely 
regarded as predictable competitions. Given the high consensus in the former 
Communist states that they were ready to leave authoritarian legacies behind and 
turn towards the West, where most electorates felt they historically belonged, the 
high endorsements of EU membership came by no means as surprises. This paper 
investigates the 2003 accession referendum in the Czech Republic, and applies a 
deduction of Zaller’s model of opinion formation (Zaller 1992), in order to explore 
whether voters relied on elite cues or endogenous factors when they made up their 
minds on how to vote on the referendum day. In addition to the fact that Zaller’s 
model rarely has been tested on accession referendums - which will be more 
thoroughly explained in the theory section – the model helps to shed light on voter 
proxies in the Czech Republic, which still are to be thoroughly explored. Moreover, 
it tests the popular assumption that European integration was an elite-led process 
Abstract 
The literature which explores public opinion formation processes 
in the newly democratised EU member states in Central and 
Eastern Europe is divided into competing schools of thought; 
one, which presumes that the inexperienced electorates in the 
newly democratised states would adopt the views of their 
preferred political elites in political debates, and one opposing 
view, which argues that despite being fresh in the experience as 
political actors, voters employ cognitive resources when making 
political choices without depending on elite recommendations. 
While research on demographic characteristics and party 
affiliations’ importance on people’s political choices have been 
conducted, and also drawn various conclusions, there is still a 
lack of research which conducts analyses of multiple voter 
proxies to ad-hoc issues. This paper wishes to contribute to this 
field of research by testing a model which poses that the 
message environment and direction of elite cues will trigger 
voters to either rely on their awareness of the issue or political 
predispositions when they make up their minds of how to vote, 
depending on whether they are being exposed to one or two 
competing elite messages, and apply this model to explore 
whether this was the case in the Czech 2003 EU accession 
referendum. The paper concludes that Czech voters employed a 
range of proxies in the opinion formation process, and that 
assumptions that the elite dictated the public vote can be 
questioned 
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with only passive consensus from the public, or whether voters actively applied 
cognitive skills when they chose how to vote in the referendum. The paper uses 
data from the Candidate Countries Eurobarometers merged with the Comparative 
Manifesto Project II Project II data set to test the validity of Zaller’s hypotheses. An 
account of the theory, elite positions on European integration, methodology, results 
and discussion will follow. 
 
Zaller’s model of opinion formation 
 
Zaller’s model of opinion formation reasons that public responses to a political 
issue will primarily depend on whether the elites convey one unified 
recommendation or two (or more) competing messages to the public, and further 
posits that political awareness and predispositions will dominate the opinion 
formation process. Zaller distinguishes between two scenarios; first, when the elites 
are unified on the issue, voters will be exposed to only one policy recommendation; 
which will cause a mainstream effect to be generated since there is a lack of 
opposing messages. The argument sounds that if this is the case, acceptance of this 
political communication will depend on the voters’ awareness, since only politically 
aware voters will be able to receive and understand the conveyed message. The 
logic is that the more informed and politically aware the voter is, the more likely 
s/he is to embrace the opinion communicated. If this logic is applied to EU 
referendums, we would be able to argue that the higher awareness an individual 
demonstrates, the more likely the s/he will be to support European integration. 
However, a different scenario takes place when elites do not reach consensus. When 
elites diverge, they will send out two (or more) mutually excluding messages to the 
public. The presence of competing flows of communication will create a 
polarisation effect, and will enable the voter to be ‘reminded’ that there are two (or 
more) policy alternatives which can be chosen, and most importantly, they will be 
made aware that the dominant message may not be compatible with her/his 
political predispositions. This, in turn, will generate a different cognitive process 
than when elites are in agreement. In cases of elite division, the acceptance of the 
dominant message - normally the (official) position of the government - may fail, 
either because it is not received due to insufficient political awareness, or because it 
is rejected due to incompatibility with political predispositions. Applying this logic 
to the accession referendums in the Czech Republic, it will follow that support for 
the government position - a ‘yes’-vote,- is expected to weaken if the message 
environment is polarised, and political predispositions will determine whether 
voters support the dominant message or not. 
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Zaller’s model has not been subject to extensive research in general and has not at 
all been applied to the new member states.1 It was proved by Marquis and Sciarini 
to be a consistent predictor of opinion formation in Swiss foreign policy 
referendums (Marquis and Sciarini 1999),2 by Kriesi and Sciarini (2003) on a 
selection of issues of foreign policy in Switzerland, by Saglie (2000) in the case of the 
Norwegian 1994 EU referendum, and by Gabel and Scheve (2007) on the EU15.  The 
main reason that the model is interesting is that it studies the difference in message 
environments and whether and how and it matters if people are being exposed to 
one or two (or more) recommendations from elites. The theoretical reasoning 
behind the model addresses a relevant question; one whether elites’ 
communications have such strong effects that agreement with the conveyed 
message will simply depend on whether people understand the matter, or, to put it 
differently, are sufficiently aware to respond to the message. This excludes the 
possibility that people can cognitively mobilise themselves on grounds of, e.g. 
political orientations and/or values, and critically examine the matter unless there 
is a competing message which ‘reminds’ them to filter the message, which they only 
will do if messages are competing for acceptance, following Zaller’s logic. Such a 
claim can certainly be criticised on a theoretical and empirical basis, given that there 
is an abundance of public opinion literature which argues that values and political 
orientations influence the public opinion formation process. However, it still poses 
an interesting model to test for case-studies in new democracies, given people’s 
short experience as political actors. Following the claim of among others, Taggart 
and Szczerbiak, who argue that the strongest determinant of voters’ choices in the 
Central and Eastern European referendums on EU membership was the direction, 
strength and clarity of elite cues, next to mass attitudes (with the former having the 
strongest effect) (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004), and the discussion on whether 
Central and Eastern European electorates will greatly depend upon political elites 
in the opinion formation process, the model may be able to illuminate whether this 
is was the case or not. Before the paper moves on to test the model, a short account 
of elite positions on European integration in the Czech Republic will be provided.  
 
Elites, citizens and Europe in the Czech Republic  
 
‘It is not the EU which wants to get into the Czech Republic!’3 
Soon after the Velvet Revolution and the subsequent division of Czechoslovakia, 
the European issue entered the arena in the newly created Republic. Playwright 
                                                        
1 Even if studies on the elite-public discourse have been undertaken, see e.g. Kopecky, P. 
and Mudde, C. (2002); Szczerbiak, A. and Taggart. P. (2001) & Beichelt, T. (2004).  
2 One of these was EU membership.  
3 Former EU commissioner for Foreign Relations Hans van den Broek, responding to Václav 
Klaus’ criticism of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy at the World Economic Forum in 
1995. Quoted in  Kopecky, P. and Učeň, P. (2003)   
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dissident and later elected President Václav Havel, who had led the 1989 
demonstrations, repeatedly stated that it was an imperative for the Czech Republic 
to ‘return to Europe,’ where is historically belonged, a view which reached high 
consensus among his countrymen.4 Commentators have observed that the Czech 
political scene early became ‘Europeanised,’ given the early entry of the European 
issue to the Czech political agenda, and early took on forms as a source of elitist 
deliberations (De Vries and Tillman 2008). However, despite this general notion, the 
political elites were not completely unified on the matter; as negotiations continued 
and accession began to become a reality; elite approaches grew increasingly 
ambiguous and displayed disparaging opinions among the political parties 
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002), a trend which consolidated in the mid-to late-1990s. 
Still, the issue has never become a strong dividing cleavage in Czech politics, which 
ensured that no major internal disagreements disrupted the relatively smooth 
Czech accession to the EU (Baun et al 2006). 
 
The dominant party which emerged after the Velvet revolution, the right-of-centre 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS), was quick to advocate pro-European policies in its 
declarations after the division of the Czechoslovak federation, and it was an ODS-
led government which applied for EU membership in January 1996. The party 
officially held the view that the Czech Republic, being a small economy, never had 
an alternative to joining the EU, and Prime Minister and party leader – now 
president – Václav Klaus argued already in 1998 that it would be ‘essential’ for the 
country to join the EMU (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, Kopecky and Učen 2003). 
However, the party took on more Eurosceptic positions as negotiations progressed, 
at least as far as its leader was concerned. Klaus adopted a self-declared 
'Thatcherite' position on the issue, which led to several clashes between the Prime 
Minister and President Havel, who embraced EU membership as an expression of 
shared European values (Hanley 2004). Claiming to be ‘not a pessimist, but a 
‘Eurorealist,’ Klaus was – and still is – anything but shy in expressing concerns 
about the projected negative effects EU membership would and will have on Czech 
politics (Strong 2005), and early portrayed himself as the one politician who would 
seek to protect Czech sovereignty from dissolving in the EU like a ‘lump of sugar in 
a cup of coffee’ (Nagengast 2003). Some of his statements reflected a more populist 
than ‘realist’ stance to the EU, as his many controversial comparisons between the 
EU and the Soviet Union as well as his famous statement that ‘the former 
dominance from the Soviet Bloc now has been replaced by that of the EU.’ Neither 
did Klaus regard all accession criteria acceptable when he re-engaged with the 
contentious Beneš decrees issue in the 2002 controversy about the case of the 
                                                        
4 The Czechoslovak federation was democratic until the Communist take-over in 1948, and 
had previously been part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Czech Republic had been 
ruled from Vienna and Slovakia from Budapest, which explains Havel’s view of the 
Republic ‘belonging to the West, not the East.’  
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expelled Sudeten Germans,5 arguing that the decrees were unacceptable from 
today's view, but also was unwilling to allow for compensations to be given to 
former expellees. Arguing that unless the Commission inserted a separate clause in 
the Accession Treaty which guaranteed that the decrees never were to be annulled 
or revised, Klaus expressed that unless such a guarantee was given, he was unsure 
whether he could ‘call on citizen to vote yes to the EU in a referendum.’ Manifestos 
which were circulated before the EU referendum confirmed that the party backed 
Klaus’ ‘Euro-realist’-stance, affirming its preference for strong trans-Atlantic ties, as 
well as rejection of a federal Europe and suggested extension of qualified majority 
voting (Baun et al. 2006). Klaus, then having become President, even decided not to 
join in the May 2004 celebrations which marked the accession to the EU, which was 
interpreted as a ‘gesture which was widely understood as a polite and historically 
resonant way in telling the Euro-elite where to go’ (Laughland 2004).  
 
Neither did the Communist Party (KSČM), which has traditionally been the most 
critical party to European integration, rejoice the path towards accession without 
reservations. The - until recently - unreformed and hard-line communists argued 
that the Czech Republic would not be able to influence the development of the EU 
on an equal basis, and also expressed concerns about the ‘democratic deficit’ of the 
EU system, claiming that reform processes were necessary (Kopecky and Mudde 
2002; Kopecky and Učeň 2003). The party’s expressed criticism of the EU took on 
nationalistic undertones at times, as their recurring claims that the integration 
process is ‘dominated by German interests’ (Hough and Handl 2004). Party leader 
Vojtech Filip (as of June 2008) also criticized the EU’s regional dimensions, claiming 
that the ‘Europe of the Regions’ is a threat to each country’s sovereignty. However, 
despite having criticised of the EU of being a tool for multinational capital to further 
exploitative policies, as well as their expressed concern over loss of sovereignty, the 
party still never recommended that the Republic never joined, but emphasised that 
this accession should happen only if the country joined with the ability to influence 
in an enlarged EU (Kopecky and Učeň 2003). The issue has since then been one of 
contention between the hard-liners and neo-communist strands of the party, hence, 
this ‘soft no’ to European integration came out as a result of a compromise between 
the conflicting factions within the party (Handl 2003). 
 
                                                        
5 The Beneš decrees led to renewed disputes in 2002 when some German and Austrian 
politicians were threatening to veto Czech EU membership unless the Czech Republic 
annulled the decrees which expelled all Sudeten Germans and Magyars from 
Czechoslovakia in 1945. The debate whether the Czech Republic could accede to the EU 
without a revision of the decrees also involved members of the European Parliament as well 
as the Hungarian government. Klaus’ claim of a separate clause in the Accession treaty 
which guaranteed that the issue would not be revised, was met with dismissal from the then 
Commissioner of enlargement, Günther Verheugen. See Nagengast (2003), p. 340ff.  
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More unconditional support for EU membership was expressed by the Social 
Democratic Party (ČSSD), the dominant party left-of-centre, which argued that the 
EU had potential to become a venue for a ‘European social democratic project.’ 
Being keen to frame itself as an alternative to the perceived Eurosceptic image of the 
ODS, the party seized the opportunity after its victory in the 1998 elections to speed 
up reforms and legislation anticipating EU accession (Kopecky and Mudde 2002). 
Moreover, the ČSSD-led government after the 2002 election emphasised conducting 
policies which held meeting the criteria of the Lisbon strategy and preparing for 
EMU as key priorities, and aimed to speed up the privatisation process, increase 
economic growth and uphold the budget balance. The successes of the policies were 
varied, but it was apparent that the Social Democrats were aiming for accession as 
early as possible (Myant 2005).  
 
However, as is common practice in Czech politics, party leaders do not strictly 
adhere to party platforms; in 2002, the then Prime Minister Miloš Zeman of the 
ČSSD sided with ODS’ Klaus in his staunchly non-conciliatory response to external 
political forces who claimed that the Beneš decrees needed to be repealed in order 
to allow for Czech accession. Labelling the Sudeten Germans as ‘Hitler’s fifth 
column,’ Zeman used the issue to tap into anti-German sentiments in order to gain 
votes at the 2002 national election (Nagengast 2003), which revealed that old hostile 
sentiments against its largest neighbour were still present within the elites of the 
party. 
 
The smaller parties in the centre never took on notable positions in the debate on 
Czech European integration, and also did not very actively take part in the 
referendum campaign. The Christian Democrats-Czechoslovak People’s Party 
(KDU-ČSL) and the Freedom Union-European Democrats (US-DEU) expressed 
clear support for full integration into the EU, as well as for further enlargement, 
views that seemed to have been produced more as responses to the sceptical profile 
of the ODS than as results of ideological reasoning (Kopecky and Učeň 2003). The 
US-DEU emphasised the opportunities which joining the single market would 
provide for the Czech Republic, and also how EU membership would constitute its 
own security identity. The centre parties decided to run together in a coalition 
(Štyrcoalice) for the 2002 election, and their joint election program emphasised the 
need for Czech participation in the EU, support for a federal Europe as well as 
Schengen and EMU, and even went so far to express hopes that the Commission in 
time would transform into a European government (Baun et al 2006).  
 
As far as the public was concerned, a survey as early as May 1994 established that 
attitudes were generally positive towards Western involvement and economic 
liberalism, and what is more, were strongly correlated with choice of party (Evans 
and Whitefield 1998), which echoed the views of the elites that opening towards 
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Europe was a prioritised issue on the agenda for the newly independent state. 
However, the initial excitement for the European project was followed with 
declining support as accession became a reality, which in comparison with the other 
accession countries along with Hungary and Estonia was comparatively low; in 
1997, only 49 percent of Czechs said they were going to vote for membership 
(Central and Eastern Eurobarometers 8), compared to 50 percent in 2002 (Candidate 
Countries Eurobarometers 2002.2), which created the necessity for a well-organised 
and convincing yes-campaign.  
 
The campaign 
 
By mid-February 2003, four months before the referendum, the topic of EU 
accession and the upcoming referendum overshadowed other issues on the political 
agenda, and elites and citizens alike had begun to mobilise for their respective 
campaigns. The official yes-campaign, led by the Foreign Ministry, had a budget of 
200 million crowns (approx. 6.25 Million Euro), and was largely based upon 
conventional advertising on television, the printed press and on billboards. It also 
set up an information line and an online information source which recommended 
citizens to vote for accession. Other civil organisations and political parties such as 
the Catholic Church and the Trade Union Confederation (ĈMKOS) joined the 
campaign, as well as pro-NGOs at local and regional levels. Former president Havel 
figured prominently in the media campaigning for accession, as well as the ČSSD, 
the KDU-ČSL and the US-DEU, though the latter two were less active. The ODS, not 
unexpected, took on a more ambiguous view, first of all claiming that a pro-EU 
campaign was not necessary, since most of its members supported membership 
anyway, however, Klaus, who assumed office as President in March, continually 
reminded the public about the need to be ‘realistic’ about the expectations of the 
projected advantages of EU membership, sticking to his 'Eurorealist' view (Hanley 
2004). He also clearly expressed his reservations by the statement: ‘5.1 to 4.9. This is 
the strength and weakness, respectively, of my yes.’ Still, the ODS released a 
statement at the eve of the referendum in which it urged people to vote for 
accession, along with the centre parties and the ČSSD (Baun et al. 2006, p. 262).   
 
The no-campaigns were fronted by loose alliances of various right-wing groupings, 
some of which with neo-conservative and anti-German outlooks. Due to limited 
funding, the strategy was to develop local grass-root networks of different groups 
and intellectuals, who largely argued that the EU was too bureaucratic, and aimed 
to draw on nationalist and anti-foreign-domination sentiments. The KSČM was 
more divided and ambivalent, however, campaigning against the EU was not a 
priority on central party level, but was mainly led by local party branches (Hanley 
2004). The party grass-root released a statement before the referendum in which it 
stated that it ‘could not recommend people to vote for EU membership,' which was 
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rejected by several officials at party elite level, which reflected the internal split on 
the issue. However, none of the anti-campaigns drew strong support (Baun et al. 
2006). 
 
The final count of votes showed that 77.33 percent of the voters who had 
participated in the referendum supported accession, however, the low turnout of 
55.21 percent, which was slightly lower than that of the preceding 2002 general 
election, in fact showed that yes-voters represented only 41.73 percent of the total 
electorate, which displayed the lowest yes-vote in any accession referendum in CEE 
except Hungary (Hanley 2004).6 There was little variation between the various 
demographic groups of the population; support was highest in Prague and lowest 
in the Liberec region in Northern Bohemia, a region with several economic and 
social problems, which is dominated by support for the radical left and extreme 
right. Urban-rural differences were marginal, and support was unsurprisingly 
highest among the young, and more surprisingly, among the over 60s. The higher 
educated were more likely to vote for than those with only primary education 
(Hanley 2004). Party alignment seemed a stronger determinant of support or 
rejection; while supporters of both the ODS, ČSSD and the centre parties had 
overwhelmingly supported membership, only 37 percent of Communist voters had 
voted yes (Baun et al. 2006.) 
 
Testing Zaller’s model 
 
Following the descriptions of the stands taken by political parties in the Czech 
Republic and the direction of the campaign, it appears evident that there was elite 
division on the issue, though it took on ambiguous forms, but what needs to be 
investigated is the extent to which the competing messages of the campaign 
impacted in voter’s choices. The knowledge that the message environment was two-
way and polarised should imply, according to Zaller’s logic, that political 
predispositions should display stronger effects than factors of awareness, given the 
fact that people were ‘cognitively mobilised’ to filter the two competing messages 
through a schemata of predispositions. Hence, three hypotheses can be suggested 
for analysis:  
 
1) Factors of awareness should have less impact on vote than political 
predispositions, and of present, should be of lower importance 
 
2) If factors or awareness should constitute factors in the opinion formation 
process, they may not necessarily predict the direction of vote, since the 
                                                        
6 For comparison, the yes votes were in percentages as follows: 93.71 Slovakia, in Hungary, 
77.45 in Poland, in Estonia, 89.6 in Slovenia, 67 in Latvia and 91 Lithuania.  
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highly aware may be expected to be aware of both messages and therefore 
would make a conscious choice between the two messages.  
 
3) Political predispositions should be the strongest determinant of vote, but 
neither this coefficient may not predict direction of vote, since 
Euroscepticism was to be found both on the left and the right of the scale. 
Hence, we cannot expect that a direct linear connection between vote 
preference and left-right placement will be found. 
 
Data and methodology 
The analysis employs data on individual-level, and uses survey data from the 
Candidate Countries Eurobarometers 2003.2 merged with the Comparative 
Manifesto Project II Data Set. The Eurobarometers measure political predispositions 
as a function of party choice, which is not very parsimonious to apply, since it 
would require that the issue would be investigated party-by-party, secondly, such a 
categorical variable would be technically difficult to include in a multivariate 
regression model. Therefore, the Eurobarometer data set was merged with the 
Comparative Manifesto Project II Data set in order to utilise the party information 
of left-right positions from the latter.7 
 
Given the rank-ordered nature of the dependent variable, this analysis employs 
ordinal logistic regression. The question and labels for the dependent variable after 
recoding are as follows: 
  
Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European 
Union would be/will be: 1) A bad thing 2) Neither good nor bad 3) A good thing8  
 
Independent variables 
The predictors which have been chosen to measure awareness represent four 
different typologies of cognitive involvement, whereas political predispositions are 
measured as functions of the voter’s preferred party’s placement on the left-right 
scale. The first group of predictors of awareness employs questions which measure 
                                                        
7 Since the left-right scale rile in the Comparative Manifesto Project II Data set is continuous and 
not intuitive, and that some parties have more than one observation, the variable has been 
manipulated to become more parsimonious to work with. First, rile was multiplied with the 
percentage of votes, sorted by country and a new variable was created by the mean of 
percentage vote, which was used to create an interim variable rile1 which was a function of rile 
multiplied with percentage vote divided with the mean of percentage vote. Sorted by country, a 
further interim variable meanrile was created by the function of the mean of rile1. Subtracting 
meanrile from the original variable rile, an intuitive variable rilescore was created, which is sorted 
by country, contains one mean observation per party and centres ‘centre’ orientation at 0 with 
negative values denoting left-of-centre orientation and positive values right-of centre 
orientation. 
8 Don’t know answers and missing values were deleted 
 
 
LIMERICK PAPERS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
2009, No. 2 
10 
 
the individual’s political participation and consist of two variables; one which asked 
the respondents to place themselves on a scale on how often they discuss politics, 
and one question which asks how often they try to persuade others of their opinion. 
The second group of predictors investigates the degree to which the individuals pay 
attention to the issue in the media; the first question asked how often the individual 
watched news on television, and the second about news on the EU specifically. The 
third set of questions controls for knowledge about the EU, and is divided into one 
question on whether the respondents personally feels informed on a scale from 1 to 
10, whilst a second variable test the actual knowledge of the respondent based on a 
set of questions which asked the respondents to inform whether a set of statements 
about the EU were true or false. The fourth group measures level of education, the 
fifth measures the effect of left-right orientation, followed by a final test for 
curvilinearity in rilescore using a squared term of the left-right variables. Following 
this division of predictors into categories, the tests will be carried out as a sequence 
of models which gradually increases the number of clustered variables.  
  
At first glance, the models present several significant predictors of vote, most of 
which suggest strong effects in the positive direction. The coefficients suggest that 
voters to a great extent had mobilised cognitive factors in order to choose between 
the options presented to them. To analyse the predictors individually; discussing 
politics and persuading other fail to achieve significance over all models, and show 
none in the final models – persuasion appears to have a certain effect before other 
variables are controlled for, but loses its effect in Model III when the media 
variables have been added. Watching EU news is a highly significant factor which 
predicts high odds for voting yes, and the predictor remains significant also when 
other variables are controlled for, however, the odds decrease slightly the more 
predictors are added to the model. Interestingly, watching TV news suggests a 
strong and negative effect on EU vote, which calls for further investigation. This can 
be interpreted either as a sheer coincidence, or it can be suggested that watching 
more news also would give people more access to negative information about the 
EU, which could have contributed to producing a negative image of the EU. 
However, such information may as well have been accessible through EU news in 
general, which predicts a positive vote, so such interpretations have to be made 
with caution. Also, general TV news could be perceived by the respondent as news 
other than EU news, hence, the correlation which occurs in these tests may not 
necessarily present a causal effect between watching TV news and being negatively 
oriented towards EU membership. In the third model when the knowledge factors 
are introduced, we see that both predictors are significant and strongly predict a 
positive vote, which is also not surprising given the demographics in Hanley’s 
study of the referendum, in addition to further studies which show that higher 
knowledge predicts positive views towards the EU across several case-studies. 
 
 
 
ZALLER & THE 2003 CZECH EU ACCESSION REFERENDUM 
ANNELIN ANDERSEN 
 
11 
 
Table 1 - Testing Zaller's model - Czech Republic, May 2003: Odds ratios9 
*Significant at 0.05 level      ** Significant at 0.01 level 
N= 567 
 
                                                        
9
 Statistics on the dependent variable: Mean: 2.42, skewness: -.797, variance: .484, kurtosis: 
2.41, standard deviation: .695.   
Predictor 
Model I Model II Model 
III 
Model 
IV 
Model V Model VI 
Log 
likelihood 
865.48262 804.62139 748.66097 736.92012 409.05775 394.62864 
 
Prob>chi2 
 
0.0009 
 
0.0000 
 
.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
.0000 
 
McFadden’s 
R2 
 
0.0081 
 
0.0778 
 
0.1138 
 
0.1258 
 
0.1929 
 
0.2213 
       
Often 
discuss 
politics  
 
.98 
 
.90 
 
.83* 
 
.78** 
 
.82 
 
.92 
 
Persuading 
others of 
opinion 
 
1.20** 
 
1.16** 
 
1.08 
 
1.08 
 
.98 
 
.97 
       
 
Watching 
EU news 
  
2.22** 
 
1.68** 
 
1.67** 
 
1.59** 
 
1.46** 
 
Watching 
TV news 
  
.60** 
 
.59** 
 
.58** 
 
.57** 
 
.57** 
       
Knowledge  
(self-
reported) 
   
1.57** 
 
1.47** 
 
1.36** 
 
1.35** 
 
Knowledge 
(actual) 
   
1.38** 
 
1.34** 
 
1.30** 
 
1.29** 
       
Education    1.45** 1.46** 1.37* 
Left-right 
position 
     
1.05** 
 
1.05** 
Left-right 
position 
     1.00** 
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Also in this model, we see that the previously added predictors lose effect slightly 
when the new variables are introduced. The effect of higher education is also not 
surprising given the demographics of the referendum vote; also for this sample, 
showed the higher educated were more likely to vote for than those with little on no 
education (Hanley 2004). Finally, left-right position is significant, but the effect 
appears weak, which can be explained by the previously mentioned suggestion that 
that there may not be a clear linear connection between EU-vote and left-right 
positioning, which is confirmed by the squared term of the predictor: there appears 
to be a curvilinear effect of left-right positioning, in which the most positive voters 
were to be found in the centre. This confirms the findings reported in the previous 
section, which reports that the most Eurosceptic parties were located on the extreme 
left (the Communist Party) and the right (the Civic Democrats). The most important 
effect of the left-right predictor is that it lifts the overall model to hold a far higher 
overall explanatory effect than was the case for the first four models; the values of 
the R2 and the Log-Likelihood become acceptably high to suggest an overall quality 
to the model. Moreover, the awareness predictors continue to lose effect, which 
suggest that this predictor alone was very strongly correlated with vote. The 
following section will divide the voters into left, centre and right to further 
investigate the effect of the previous coefficients, and whether political 
predispositions sent voters in different directions based on awareness. 
 
Awareness and political predispositions combined 
 
The rilescore variable for the Czech Republic created large intervals between the 
political parties, and given the clear gaps between left, centre and right, it became a 
relatively easy task to distinguish between voter groups. Parties with values lower 
that -10 were set as left, parties which deviated with -10 or +10 from the centre 
constituted the centre category, and parties with values over 10 were denoted as 
right. Setting the values of the various predictors which measured awareness to 
low, medium or high, three groups of level of awareness could be created, one low, 
one medium and one high.10  
 
The general picture suggests that when awareness increased, so did support for the 
EU. Low aware centre-and left-voters were not convinced about the advantages of 
EU membership, while surprisingly, low aware right-wing voters just about tipped 
the balance towards a yes, which suggests that they did not absorb Klaus’ 
Euroscepticism. The figures for medium aware voters show that they were 
significantly more positive towards EU membership than all low aware groups, 
particularly, the large difference between low and medium aware centre-voters is 
                                                        
10 This was done using the prvalue command in STATA, setting the values for the awareness 
predictors to minimum, mediun and maximum. 
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remarkable; possibly, the higher level of engagement in the EU issue among the 
medium aware made these voters become overwhelmingly positive towards EU 
membership. Why medium aware right-voters seemed to have dismissed Klaus 
‘Eurorealism’ may be explained that they simply knew more about the issue, which 
can be the effect which created the positive vote, which the regression models 
confirms, however, this is just a suggestion; further investigation into the issue will 
have to be conducted to state this for sure. Centre-voters were the most positive 
among the highly aware voters, closely followed by their counterparts on the right, 
who only had marginally lower probabilities. Again, voters on the left were slightly 
less convinced, though overwhelmingly positive towards the EU. 
 
Table 2 - Predicted probabilities for saying that EU membership would be 
a ‘good thing’ divided by voter groups and awareness11 
Awareness Left Centre Right 
    
Low 0.424 0.415 0.503 
Middle 0.707 0.923 0.866 
High 0.747 0.963 0.959 
 
Discussion 
 
The findings from the regression model and the table of predicted probabilities for 
the voter groups fail to fully meet the three hypotheses which were formulated 
from the hypotheses of Zaller’s model. To begin with the first hypothesis, which 
assumed that factors of awareness should have little impact on the vote, the results 
which were found in this study suggest the contrary; the effects of awareness 
predictors are strong and in a positive direction, again, with the exception of 
watching TV news, which partially confirms the second hypothesis that awareness 
may not necessarily predict the direction of vote. Even if the left-right variable also 
produces valid effects on votes and greatly increases the explanatory effect of the 
regression model as whole when it is being controlled for, as well as weakens the 
magnitude of the awareness variables, it still cannot be regarded as so 
overwhelmingly significant that it excludes the impact of other factors, most of 
which keep the expected level of significance. More likely, political predispositions 
and factors of awareness seem to work alongside each other. 
                                                        
11 Left-wing voters were classified as voter who supported the Communist Party (KSCM) 
and the Social Democratic Party (CSSD). Centre-voters were defined as voters who 
supported the Green Party (SZ), the Christian and Democratic Union - Czechoslovak 
People's Party (KDU –ČSL), and the Freedom Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU). Right-
voters were defined as voters who supported the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), since this 
was the only party to score higher on rilescore than 10. Note that predicted probabilities with 
values higher than 0.5 are positive values. 
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When addressing the third hypothesis, which expects that political predispositions 
would be the strongest predictor of vote, we find that some of the findings can be 
argued to support Zaller’s model, while other findings do not. To begin with, 
political predispositions undoubtedly produce valid predictors for EU vote in the 
regression model, showing a curvilinear correlation in which the most positive 
voters were to be found in the centre group. When voter groups were divided into 
their respective left-right placement and divided by level of awareness, it does seem 
that voters followed their party’s recommendation to a certain extent; the left-voters 
accepted the convinced yes from their leaders (again, with possible exceptions of 
the Communist voters in the sample, who could have modified the strength of the 
yes), the centre-voters echoed the unambiguous yes from their mother parties – 
with the exception of the low aware left- and centre-voters. For the voters on the 
right, it seems that none of the groups picked up on the Eurosceptic statements 
from their President; the low aware were just leaning towards a yes, and the highly 
aware were overwhelmingly positive. Hence, if voters had been more influenced by 
the messages sent by the elites, it would appear plausible to predict lower support 
from voters on the left and the right, given the ambiguous elite messages, if Zaller’s 
logic would hold in this case. The fact that there is a substantial gap between low 
and highly aware in terms of support could possibly be interpreted as a reflection of 
the internal divisions in the parties on the edges, but this will only constitute 
speculations at this stage.  
 
Still, the uniform pattern of increasing support as a function of increasing 
awareness makes it difficult not to question whether voters so blindly followed the 
elite recommendations, as Zaller would predict. This makes it possible to argue 
against Zaller’s hypotheses, however, these figures can also be used as partial 
support for his overall hypothesis, if we rephrase it slightly. Firstly, to argue 
against, it can be claimed that if political predispositions would be the strongest 
predictor of voter’s choices, it would override the impact of awareness, which 
should not produce different levels of support within the party groups, which was 
the case here. On the other hand, Zaller argues – for one-way message 
environments, that is - that only those with sufficient awareness will be able to 
understand the message conveyed and hence would support it. Hence, it could be 
argued that his thesis of reliance on awareness in one-way message environments 
may apply to two-way message environments as well, given the high support from 
the medium-to highly aware groups. However, the weak support from the low 
aware left and right-voters suggest that they apparently did pick up the ambiguous 
messages from the elites, which makes this argument quite vague. On the other 
hand, the lack of support from low aware centre-voters may suggest awareness 
seem to have had a stronger impact than elite cues. Moreover, the fact that the 
highly aware were more likely to vote yes than the medium and less aware, may 
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not just simply mean that they understood the official position and supported it, 
but since these would be expected to also understand contradictory messages: they 
appear to have evaluated both options, and in most cases, opted for a positive view 
towards EU membership. This contradicts suspicions that electorates in new 
democracies will blindly follow their leaders – the Czechs appeared to have 
mobilised endogenous factors in the process too - and critically analysed their 
parties’ positions.  Again, we find it difficult to find support for Zaller’s model. 
What seems most apparent to conclude from the figures is that both groups of 
variables produced significant predictors towards EU vote, and that awareness and 
political predispositions interacted in the opinion formation process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, Zaller’s hypothesis does not achieve sufficient support from the Czech 
case to conclude that the model can efficiently predict the opinion formation 
process in this case. While voters’ choices mostly were, at least partially, in line with 
their parties’ recommendations, they also clearly employed cognitive factors while 
they made up their minds towards the vote. The final decision of the majority of 
respondents in this sample to vote yes does not seem to have been a product of elite 
recommendation only – some voter groups actually partially went against their 
elites when the figures were broken down to level of awareness and left-right 
position. Therefore, it must be concluded that Zaller’s model fails to adequately 
explain public opinion formation in the Czech accession referendum when he 
predicted that political predispositions would be the determining factor in a two-
way message environment. Due to the impact of awareness as well, it seems safest 
to opt for a conclusion for this case-study in line with Winnie the Pooh’s standard 
preferred option; ‘Yes, please, both.’   
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